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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

must oversee all questions essential to resolving interstate disputes.
The Court concluded Kansas' argument ignored the full language of
the Special Master's recommendation, which made the Colorado Water Court's determination subject to Kansas' right to relief under the
Court's original jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court overruled this
objection.
On Kansas' objection, the Special Master found Colorado was in
compliance for the years 1997-1999 using a measurement period of
longer than one year. The Court overruled Kansas' objection to the
Special Master's finding because the Court already ruled against Kansas regarding the 10-year measurement period discussed above.
The Court also ruled against Kansas on fifteen items, which the
Special Master refused to make recommendations on, and which Kansas grouped in three categories: (1) disputed computer model calibration issues, (2) disputed 1997-1999 accounting issues, and (3) disputed
future compliance issues. The Court concluded the issues addressed
by category two were moot under the Court's ruling on the 1997-1999
compliance issue discussed above. As for categories one and three, the
Court stated that with the passage of time, the states would learn more
about the computer model's strengths and weaknesses and, because
the Court retained jurisdiction over the case, it could direct the Special
Master to address these remaining issues later.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, the Court accepted
the Special Master's recommendations, overruled Kansas' objections,
and recommitted the case to the Special Master for preparation of a
decree.
Jeff Gillio
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Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. United States Dep't of the
Army, 395 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding the Army Corps of Engineers properly exercised jurisdiction and followed proper procedures
to issue a permit for an offshore data tower on the Outer Continental
Shelf).
On August 19, 2002, the United States Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps") issued a navigability permit to Cape Wind Associates ("Cape
Wind") for the purpose of erecting an offshore data tower in an area of
Nantucket Sound located on the federally controlled Outer Continental Shelf ("OCS"). The tower's purpose was to gather data to determine the feasibility of locating a wind energy plant in Nantucket
Sound. After a public notice and comment period, the Corps issued
Cape Wind the permit. The Corps accompanied the permit with an
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Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact
("FONSI"). Cape Wind's permit was subject to additional conditions,
including the removal of the tower within five years, required sharing
of the collected data, and permitting government agencies and research institutes to place additional data gathering equipment on the
tower.
The Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound ("Alliance") filed an action against the Corps in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging (1) the Corps lacked authority to issue a
permit for the data tower; (2) the Corps acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") by
granting Cape Wind a permit, despite Cape Wind's lack of a property
right on the OCS; and (3) the Corps failed to comply with requirements for evaluating the data tower's environmental impacts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Corps, and the
Alliance appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit. The court reviewed the lower court's decision on the data
tower permit de novo. However, the permit application for the wind
farm was separate from the data tower application; therefore, the court
did not consider it.
First, the court determined the Corps had proper jurisdiction to issue the permit. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA")
and the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 authorized the permit. Congress passed OCSLA in 1953 to assert federal jurisdiction over the OCS
and to establish a regulatory framework for the extraction of minerals.
Congress amended the statute in 1978 to extend jurisdiction to "devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed, which may be
erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing resources therefrom...." Alliance argued Congress intended
this language to limit the Corps' permit granting authority to structures related to the extraction of mineral resources. Although the
court decided the statutory language was ambiguous, the court reasoned there was clear legislative intent in the 1978 OSCLA Amendments Conference Report ("Report"). In the Report, Congress explained it did not intend to limit the authority of the Corps to structures used for exploration, development, removal or transport of minerals. Consequently, the court held the Corps had proper jurisdiction
to issue the permit.
Second, the court considered whether the Corps properly considered Cape Wind's lack of property interest on the OCS land for which
the Corps issued the permit. The Corps' regulations provided (1) the
granting of a permit did not convey a property right, (2) the applicant's signature on the permit application affirmed that the applicant
possessed or would possess the requisite property interest to undertake
the activity proposed in the application, and (3) that dispute over
property ownership would not be a factor in the Corps' public interest
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decision. The Corps interpreted these regulations as requiring it only
to remind applicants that they must obtain proper property rights, not
for the Corps to evaluate property disputes. The court concluded the
Corps reasonably interpreted its regulations; therefore, the Corps was
not required to evaluate Cape Wind's property interests before granting a permit.
Next, the court determined the Corps properly considered the
various impacts of the data tower on federal property as negligible.
Thus, the court rejected the Alliance's argument that erecting the data
tower contradicted public interest.
The court then addressed whether the Corps' reliance on Cape
Wind's affirmation that it would obtain the necessary property rights
was capricious, in violation of the APA. The court declined to determine whether a permit alone sufficiently authorized building on the
OCS; however, it concluded the construction of a single, temporary
data tower could not be an infringement on any federal property ownership interest in the OCS. Therefore, the court held no additional
Congressional authorization was required to proceed with the data
tower's construction.
Finally, the court addressed whether the Corps provided sufficient
notice and comment opportunities to review the proposed project.
The Alliance argued the construction of the data tower of was without
precedent, therefore requiring the Corps to make a draft FONSI available for public comment. The court rejected this argument, stating
that although this was the first data tower permit granted in these particular shoals, it was not the first physically similar structure permitted
in Massachusetts waters. Thus, the court held the Corps complied with
its requirements to engage the public in preparing the required environmental documents.
After rejecting each of the Alliance's claims, the court affirmed the
district court's summaryjudgment in favor of the Corps.
JulieM. Schmidt
Knott v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 386 F.3d 368 (1st Cir. 2004)
(denying petition for review when Federal Energy Regulatory Commission exercised proper authority over navigable watercourse, provided a
hearing, and issued orders that were not arbitrary or capricious).
Riverdale Power & Electric Company and its owner, James Knott,
(collectively "Knott") filed a petition with the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit to review three orders issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") concerning Knott's hydroelectric project ("Project") that included a river dam and a water
impoundment area. Knott operated the Project under a voluntary
conditional license granted by FERC pursuant to the Federal Power
Act ("FPA").

